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A NEW PARADIGM FOR INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SOFTWARE 
MARK H. WEBBINK1  
ABSTRACT 
A Winter 2004 article by Bradford L. Smith and Susan O. 
Mann of Microsoft published in The University of Chicago Law 
Review suggests that the development and growth of the software 
industry in the U.S. is a direct outgrowth of the implementation of 
intellectual property regimes, specifically copyright and patent, 
with respect to software in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  This 
paper suggests that such patents were neither the sole nor the 
principal factor for the development of the software industry, that 
concerns about patents manifested prior to or soon after their 
application to software have proven true, and that patents are, in 
fact, not serving the interests of either the U.S. software industry or 
the consuming public.  To that end, this paper advances 
recommendations for reforming the U.S. patent system as well as 
consideration of a new schema for protecting software.
He who receives an idea from me receives instruction himself without 
lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light 
without darkening me.     
    - Thomas Jefferson (1813) 
THE SMITH-MANN ARTICLE 
¶1 Bradford Smith, Microsoft’s General Counsel, and Susan Mann, 
also of Microsoft, wrote an article published in 2004 entitled Innovation and 
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object orientation, algorithm, application extension or other crucial 
technique.”5
¶4 Think of it for a second.  Had software patents been around since 
1975, the following inventions would have been subject to patents for the 
better part of the last 20 years:  (a) WordStar, the first PC-based word 
processor released in 1979; (b) VisiCalc, the first PC-based spreadsheet 
program released in 1979; and (c) Harvard Graphics, the first PC-based 
presentation graphics program released in 1983.  Where would we be today 
had we been locked into only those choices?  Needless to say, Microsoft 
Office would not be ubiquitous.  Interestingly, Dan Bricklin, one of the 
inventors of VisiCalc, regularly writes and speaks today about the problem 
with software patents.6  In 1991, when Bill Gates made his remarks, 
Microsoft had fewer than 50 filed patent applications; today Microsoft has 
over 4,000 issued patents and more than 10,000 pending patent 
applications.7 
TRIVIAL SOFTWARE PATENTS 
¶5 CONTU's speculation that “only the very few programs which 
survive the rigorous application and appeals procedure could be patented” 
has proven far from correct.8  Compare the number of patents that have 
been filed in two key areas in the last 22 years, pharmaceuticals and 
software.  If one examines the principal patent class in which 
pharmaceutical patents are registered (U.S. class 514), one finds that in a 
22-year stretch almost 80,000 pharmaceutical patents have been issued.9  
These pharmaceutical patents account for the billions of dollars of income 
and thousands, if not tens of thousands, of drugs that have come to market 
during that time.  However, during that same period, the software industry, 
which has been equally as strong financially throughout that period, has 
acquired more than 150,000 patents10 on various forms of software or, more 
                                                     
5 Bill Gates, Challenges and Strategy, (May 16, 1991), available at 
http://discuss.sarahsbookstores.com/Bill_Gates_Challenges_And_Strategy_Me
mo. 
6 Dan Bricklin, Patents and Software, at 
http://www.bricklin.com/patentsandsoftware.htm (last viewed October 8, 2004). 
7 As identified by searching Microsoft, as assignee, against the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark database utilizing the patent and patent application advanced search 
functions found at http://www.uspto.gov/patft/index.html. 
8  CONTU supra note 4. 
9 As identified by searching the Current U.S. Classification for Class 514 against 
the U.S. Patent and Trademark database utilizing the patent and patent 
application advanced search functions found at 
http://www.uspto.gov/patft/index.html. 
10 Based on all patents issued in classes 345, 700-707 and 715-717, which cover 
the bulk of software patents, as identified by searching the Current U.S. 
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specifically, software features, even though pharmaceuticals had a 
significant head start; more than 75% of those software patents have a filing 
date of 1994 or after. 
¶6 That is not a complete picture because many of those 
pharmaceutical patents cover the same drugs.  A further comparison is 
worthwhile.  Compare the number of pharmaceutical patents required to 
protect a couple of blockbuster drugs to the number of patents obtained by 
one company on one selected software feature—the positioning and/or 
movement of a cursor.  Pfizer's blockbuster, multi-billion dollar Viagra is 
covered by just one patent.11  Similarly, just one patent covered Merck's 
blockbuster, multi-billion dollar Zocor.12  By comparison, Microsoft has 14 
separate patents on the positioning and movement of a cursor,13 and they 
have two additional applications pending on it.14  Rather than producing 
broad innovations to advance the software industry, like the earlier-
mentioned inventions such as the word processor, spreadsheet, or 
presentation graphics, information is being sliced and diced to the point that 
every trivial combination or extension of prior software technology is being 
accorded the same protection as a groundbreaking drug.  In the summer of 
2004, when Bill Gates announced that Microsoft would be increasing its 
annual patent filings from 2,000 to 3,000 per year, it was notable that there 
was no corresponding 50% increase in Microsoft spending for research and 
development.  In fact, contrary to the strong correlation shown in Table 1 
among Microsoft’s revenue, R&D spending, and patent applications filed 
between 1994 and 1999, the rate of increase in Microsoft patent filings will 
now outstrip growth in revenue or R&D.  In other words, the block of 
cheese is the same size; the slices are simply thinner. 
¶7 It should be evident that this system of protecting software is not 
the root cause of innovation in the software industry.  Microsoft is a prime 
                                                                                                                       
Classification for these classes against the U.S. Patent and Trademark database 
utilizing the patent and patent application advanced search functions found at 
http://www.uspto.gov/patft/index.html. 
11 As identified by searching the term “Viagra” utilizing the search tool found at 
http://www.fda.gov/cder/ob/docs/querytn.htm. 
12 As identified by searching the term “Zocor” utilizing the search tool found at 
http://www.fda.gov/cder/ob/docs/querytn.htm. 
13 As identified by searching Microsoft as assignee and the term “cursor” in the 
title of issued patents against the U.S. Patent and Trademark database utilizing 
the patent advanced search functions found at 
http://www.uspto.gov/patft/index.html. 
14 As identified by searching Microsoft as assignee and the term “cursor” in the 
title of patent applications against the U.S. Patent and Trademark database 
utilizing the patent application advanced search functions found at 
http://www.uspto.gov/patft/index.html. 
 
2005 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW No. 12 
example of patents significantly trailing, rather than leading, innovation and 
fiscal success.  Patents having played no meaningful role in the first 10 
years of Microsoft’s life as a public corporation.  Contrast this with the 
pharmaceutical industry.  A competitor for one of those major drugs only 
had to identify three patents to ascertain whether they were infringing and 
only had to work around those three patents if they chose to compete.  By 
contrast, the software industry is producing thousands upon thousands of 
inherently meaningless software patents of dubious value, each a potential 
threat to innovation and competition.  And, whereas each of Pfizer and 
Merck undoubtedly spent hundreds of millions of dollars in bringing Viagra 
and Zocor to market, the cost of filing and prosecuting the average software 
patent far outweighs any economic value such patent will produce, or the 
cost of producing the so-called invention.  One has to speculate whether the 
sole purpose of such increases in patent filings is simply to substitute a legal 
monopoly for an illegal one. 
INVALID SOFTWARE PATENTS 
¶8 It is bad enough that software patents are being filed at an 
astounding rate for such trivial matters, but the lack of scrutiny such patents 
receive, is telling as well.  Software patents are not the only class of patents 
that are vulnerable to reexamination and invalidation; patents of all classes 
are highly vulnerable to such assertions.  In their report entitled Empirical 
Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, John R. Allison and Mark A. 
Lemley of the University of Texas examine patent validity opinions from an 
8-year period through 1996.15  They found that fully 46% of all patents 
litigated were invalidated.16  When only software patents were considered, a 
third were invalidated.17  This comes as no surprise to anyone who has spent 
time reviewing software patents.  The lack of an established and easily 
accessible body of prior art, reduced standards of non-obviousness, and 
pressure on the USPTO examiners to meet prosecution performance 
statistics have all contributed to this condition. 
SOFTWARE PATENTS – INNOVATION OR A BARRIER TO ENTRY? 
¶9 The problems presented by software patents and their negative 
impact on innovation have not gone unnoticed.  As pointed out in their 
paper entitled The Software Patent Experiment, James Bessen and Robert 
Hunt argue that there is reasonable evidence to show that software patents 
                                                     
15 John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of 
Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205-206 (1998), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=118149.
16 Id. at 16.  
17 Id. at 17. 
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are not inducing innovation.18  They found that established firms obtain 
most software patents and to a greater degree than established firms in other 
industries.  Interestingly, they also found a negative correlation between 
increases in a firms' software patent focus and their R&D intensity, 
suggesting that such established firms are substituting software patents for 
R&D.  This is born out further by Bessen and Hunt in their finding that: 
“[Where companies are assembling large portfolios of software 
patents, such] firms may compete to tax each others' inventions and in 
the process reduce their competitors' incentive to engage in R&D.  The 
outcome of patent litigation and licensing agreements often depends 
on the size of the firm's patent portfolio.  This creates an incentive to 
build larger patent portfolios, especially when the firm focuses on 
patents as a competitive strategy.  In this account, firms choose to 
compete in court, rather than in the marketplace.”19
¶10 They go on to hypothesize: 
“During the early 1980s, patents were relatively costly to obtain, and 
this might have discouraged substitution away from R&D and toward 
strategic patenting.  By the mid 1990s, software patents became a 
relatively inexpensive way to expand patent portfolios.  This may have 
increased the attractiveness of a strategy that emphasizes patent rights 
over a strategy based on R&D.  Such a change in strategy would be 
particularly attractive to mature firms if their R&D labs are not as 
productive as they once were.”20
¶11 In a 2004 research report prepared by Deutsche Bank Research, the 
authors discuss the issue of Germany's lag in introducing technology 
innovation.21  While the report calls for properly valuing intellectual 
property as one step in increasing innovation, it also calls for “a balanced IP 
protection regime to foster the creation and flow of ideas,” going on to state 
that “stronger IP protection is not always better.  Chances are that patents on 
software, common practice in the US and on the brink of being legalised in 
Europe, in fact stifle innovation.  Europe could still alter course.”22  Citing 
                                                     
18 JAMES BESSEN & ROBERT M. HUNT, THE SOFTWARE PATENT EXPERIMENT, 2 
(Research on Innovation Working Paper, 2004), available at 
http://www.researchoninnovation.org/softpat.pdf.   
19 Id. at 14-15. 
20 Id. at 15. 
21 DEUTSCHE BANK RESEARCH, INNOVATION IN GERMANY: WINDOWS OF 
OPPORTUNITY, (June 22, 2004), available at 
http://www.dbresearch.com/servlet/reweb2.ReWEB?rwkey=u435967&%24rwfr
ame=0.  
22 Id. 
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the findings and suggestions of a study by James Bessen and Eric Maskin.23 
Deutsche Bank recommends favoring copyright protection over patent 
protection for software as a means of maintaining a more level playing field 
and attracting and inviting innovation from the sector that historically has 
produced it—the small- and medium-sized enterprise.  It is significant that 
Europeans are recognizing the flaws in the U.S. system. 
¶12 This sentiment is further echoed in the August 2004 report by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers for the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs 
entitled Rethinking the European ICT Agenda.24 In that report, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers states: 
“There are particular threats to the European ICT [Information and 
Communication Technology] industry such as the current discussion 
on the patent on software.  The mild regime of IP protection in the past 
has led to a very innovative and competitive software industry with 
low entry barriers.  A software patent, which serves to protect 
inventions of a non-technical nature, could kill the high innovation 
rate.”25
¶13 In another empirical study reported by Petra Moser of MIT in the 
2003 paper entitled How Do Patent Laws Influence Innovation?  Evidence 
From Nineteenth-Century World Fairs,26 Moser finds no evidence that 
patent laws increased levels of innovative activity.  Rather, he reveals 
strong evidence that patent systems influenced the distribution of innovative 
activity across industries.  In fact, evidence presented by Moser 
substantiates the contention that countries without patent laws were just as 
innovative as those with strong patent protection.  Moser’s findings are 
further supported in Bronwyn Hall’s 2003 paper, Business Method Patents, 
Innovation and Policy.27  Hall reaches two conclusions:  “(1) there exists a 
unique standard of nonobviousness that maximizes the rate of innovation in 
                                                     
23 JAMES BESSEN & ERIC MASKIN, SEQUENTIAL INNOVATION, PATENTS, AND 
IMITATION (Dept. of Econ., Mass. Inst. of Technology, Working Paper No. 00-
01, 2000), available at http://www.researchoninnovation.org/patrev.pdf. 
24 DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND POST, THE 
NETHERLANDS MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, RETHINKING THE EUROPEAN 
ICT AGENDA, (Aug. 2004) available at https://www.ictstrategy-
eu2004.nl/pdf/Rethinking_the_European_ICT_agenda_def.pdf. 
25 Id. at 50.
26 PETRA MOSER, HOW DO PATENT LAWS INFLUENCE INNOVATION? EVIDENCE 
FROM NINETEENTH-CENTURY WORLD FAIRS, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 9909, 2003), available at 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w9909. 
27 BRONWYN HALL, BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS, INNOVATION, AND POLICY, 
(Econ. Dept., University of California, Berkeley, Working Paper E03-331, 
2003), available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/iber/econ/E03-331/. 
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a given industry; and (2) contrary to the conventional wisdom, reductions in 
the nonobviousness requirement are more likely to encourage innovation in 
industries that innovate slowly than in industries that innovate rapidly.”28  
She goes on to state:  “The implication is that in rapidly innovating 
industries where each new product builds on others, welfare is more likely 
to be enhanced by having a high hurdle for obtaining a patent.”29  Clearly, 
this defines the state of the software industry. 
CROSS-LICENSING – THREATENING START-UPS 
¶14 Problems are not limited to the patenting process and the stifling of 
innovation resulting solely there from.  Most of these same information 
technology companies, who have aggressively pursued thousands of 
software patents, have also entered into cross-license agreements with each 
other.  As feudal lords, they have no interest in internecine fighting among 
themselves, so they promise not to sue each other for patent infringement.  
Everybody else is left on the outside looking in, including all of the small 
start-ups that are, more often than not, the source of true innovation in the 
software industry. 
¶15 Why are these cross-licenses so valuable to the major players and 
why are they threatening to the small and medium businesses?  In part it is 
the sheer cost of patent litigation.  Practitioners in the field of patent 
litigation will tell you it is some of the most expensive litigation to which a 
party can be exposed.  An industry rule of thumb is that any patent 
infringement lawsuit will easily cost $1.5 million in legal fees alone to 
defend. 
¶16 The licensing of software patents has become an industry unto 
itself.  IBM took an early lead when it recognized that its vast portfolio of 
patents was not producing any direct income.  Led by the efforts of 
Marshall Phelps, IBM began an aggressive campaign of “suggesting” that 
other companies pay for a license to IBM's broad patent portfolio.  Such 
“suggestions”, while often based on specific patents, often proved 
sufficiently intimidating simply by the sheer size of IBM's portfolio.  These 
efforts paid off for IBM.  In the year 2000 alone IBM generated more than 
$1.6 billion in intellectual property licensing income.30  IBM has been 
roundly criticized for its aggressive licensing practices,31 and now those 
                                                     
28 Id. at 7. 
29 Id. at 8. 
30 Elisa Barton, Big Blue’s Big Brother Lab, WIRED NEWS, (Apr. 24, 2001), at 
http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,43186,00.html. 
31 Gary L. Reback, Patently Absurd, FORBES.COM, (Jun. 24, 2002), at 
http://www.forbes.com/asap/2002/0624/044.html. 
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practices have been adopted by Microsoft with its hiring of IBM's former 
head of intellectual property licensing, Marshall Phelps. 
SOFTWARE IP – DENYING INNOVATION, DENYING CHOICE 
¶17 Today in the U.S. information industry, we are observing the 
building of an iron curtain of intellectual property.  It is an iron curtain built 
with bricks consisting of thousands upon thousands of weak and oftentimes 
invalid software patents.  It is an iron curtain built with the mortar of cross-
license agreements that protect large patent holders at the expense of the 
small start-up.  It is an iron curtain built on a foundation of non-disclosure 
that runs directly contrary to the purpose set forth in the Constitution for the 
granting of copyrights and patents.  It is an iron curtain intended to keep 
customers walled in and competitors walled out.  It is an iron curtain erected 
to deny freedom—freedom of choice. 
¶18 Some might wonder what is fundamentally wrong with this.  
Although a few of these companies have gotten into hot water in the past 
over antitrust violations, are they not simply taking advantage of the law?  
Many have purportedly established these large patent portfolios for 
defensive purposes, solely to protect themselves from the threats of others, 
despite the fact that they have eliminated the majority of the greatest threats 
through cross-licensing. 
¶19 The problem, in part, lies in the assumption that patent law, as 
presently applied to software, is infallible.  The application of patents to 
software has only been in place since the early 1980's.  Early on, concerns 
were expressed that by forcing software into a patent regime we were 
shoving the proverbial square peg in a round hole.  One must ask whether 
such uses, or abuses, are not running afoul of the very foundation of our 
patent system, the U.S. Constitution.  While granting these limited duration 
and scope monopolies, the Constitution clearly recognized there was a 
higher purpose to be served, i.e., the advancement of science and the useful 
arts.  We have now established a patent system for protecting software that 
is failing to promote that progress. 
THE IMMEDIATE REMEDY - EUROPE 
¶20 There are, however, solutions available, both immediate and long-
term, that are applicable in the U.S. and abroad.  An early lead is being 
taken in Europe as the European Commission and European Parliament 
work to establish a uniform system for software patents (more properly, 
computer-implemented inventions) across the European Union.32 While the 
                                                     
32 See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the Patentability of Computer-Implemented Inventions, COM(02)92 final, 
available at http://www2.europarl.eu.int/oeil/file.jsp?id=219592. 
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final result of this legislative process remains uncertain, what is certain are 
some of the amendments that are likely to be incorporated into the 
legislation.  First is the definition of the term “technical contribution” as it is 
incorporated into the legislation.  A narrow definition of this term, along the 
lines of its interpretation to date by the courts of Germany, will eliminate 
the vast majority of business method patents and will restore a substantial 
non-obviousness test to software patents.  The second is the addition of a 
statutory protection of the right to create interoperable products.  Should 
those amendments be adopted, the European legislation will have gone a 
long way toward addressing some of the more severe problems inherent in 
the U.S. patent system. 
THE IMMEDIATE REMEDY – U.S. 
¶21 One source of immediate remedies is set forth in the FTC report To 
Promote Innovation:  The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law 
and Policy,33 in which the FTC recommends the following changes to our 
patent system: 
• Creation of a new administrative procedure to allow 
post-grant review of and opposition to patents; 
• Specify that challenges to the validity of a patent must 
only meet the test of a “preponderance of the 
evidence” rather than the current standard of “clear 
and convincing evidence;” 
• Tightening of the legal standards used to evaluate 
whether a patent is “obvious”, placing a greater burden 
on the patent holder to show that “commercial 
success” is an indicator of non-obviousness as well as 
the connection between the claimed invention and 
such commercial success, as well as giving greater 
credence to whether the invention was suggested to 
one of ordinary skill in the art, i.e., the “suggestion” 
test; 
• Providing the resources and policies and procedures to 
permit greater and more thorough review of patents 
and greater disclosure by applicants; 
                                                     
33 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER 
BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (Oct. 2003), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/10/cpreport.htm.  
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• Giving consideration to possible harm to competition 
before extending the scope of patentable subject 
matter; 
• Requiring the publication of all patent applications 18 
months after filing, not just those that are also subject 
to international filings; and 
• A tightening of the standards for willful infringement. 
¶22 Another source for proposed patent reform is the National Academy 
of Science (NAS) report A Patent System for the 21st Century.34  In addition 
to addressing some of the proposals advanced by the FTC, the NAS 
recommends:  (a) strengthening the USPTO's capabilities; (b) shielding 
some research uses of patented inventions from infringement liability; (c) 
limiting the subjective elements of patent litigation; and (d) harmonizing the 
U.S., European, and Japanese patent examination systems. 
¶23 A third source of suggestions is the USPTO report The 21st Century 
Strategic Plan.35  While primarily focused on improvements in the 
operation of the USPTO, this report acknowledges that statutory and rule 
changes are also necessary if the patent system is to meet its essential 
purpose. 
¶24 Finally, there is the report from the National Innovation Initiative 
(NII) entitled Innovate America – Thriving in a World of Challenge and 
Change36 which states that:  “A balanced legal regime that both protects the 
rewards of intellectual property and facilitates the spread of open standards 
is one of the requisites for an American Innovation Century.” 
¶25 Among the problems cited in the NII report are the issuance of 
inappropriate and poor quality patents, tension between the spread open 
standards and traditional IP protection, and the need for limits on 
infringement remedies. 
¶26 Even Brad Smith, General Counsel of Microsoft, has called for a 
number of these reforms, as well as greater harmonization around the world.  
This is an area on which Brad and this author agree.  Specifically, this 
author advocates: 
                                                     
34 A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (Stephen Merrill et al. eds., 2004) 
available at http://www.nap.edu/html/patentsystem/. 
35 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, THE 21ST CENTURY STRATEGIC PLAN 
(Feb. 3, 2003), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat21/. 
36 NATIONAL INNOVATION INITIATIVE, COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, 
INNOVATE AMERICA – THRIVING IN A WORLD OF CHALLENGE AND CHANGE, 
(July 23, 2004), available at 
http://www.compete.org/pdf/NII_Interim_Report.pdf. 
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• Non-diversion of PTO fees; 
• Third-party participation in the patent examination 
process; 
• Post-grant oppositions; 
• Challenges to the validity of patents to be based on a 
“preponderance of the evidence,” not “clear and 
convincing evidence” standard; 
• Restoration of the once-strong non-obviousness 
standard; 
• A higher threshold in finding willful infringement; 
• A higher threshold before granting injunctive relief; 
• Publication of all patent applications after 18 months; 
• Harmonization with Europe to narrow the scope of 
what is patentable in the software and business method 
arenas as well as assuring the right to interoperability. 
LOOKING AT THE LONG-TERM 
¶27 The patent system in the U.S. today as applied to software is not 
inducing innovation; innovation in the software industry occurs despite the 
patent system.  The system of intellectual property protection for software is 
so fundamentally broken that one prominent industry official, Andy Grove, 
chairman of Intel, has stated the U.S. “needs to revamp not just the patent 
system, but the entire system of intellectual property law.”37  
¶28 The recommendations for reforming the patent system are all within 
the realm of possible and necessary.  At the same time, we should not 
assume that, even as modified and improved, the application of patent law 
to software is inherently the best or most logical means of protecting the 
interests of the developing party.  Perhaps we should consider a new 
paradigm that is specifically designed for software and incorporates the best 
elements of both patents and copyright.  Some characteristics of such a 
paradigm could include: 
• a shorter term of protection (5-7 years would maintain 
the speed of innovation); 
                                                     
37 Jonathan Krim, Patenting Air or Protecting Property?, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 
2003, at E01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-
dyn/A54548-2003Dec10. 
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• protection only for complete systems or features, not 
components (avoids the trivial); 
• strong protection (reward first movers); 
• published source code (allows knowledge to advance); 
and 
• interoperability. 
¶29 Compared to other forms of art covered by either patent or 
copyright, software is still in its infancy.  Let us not assume that a regime 
that protected other forms of art is suitable to software.  Let us not assume 
that the Diamond38 and State Street39 courts were correct in permitting the 
application of patents to software.  It is time to reexamine their conclusions 
and determine whether an alternative regime would be more appropriate.  
The future of the U.S. software industry may depend on it. 
                                                     
38 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).  
39 State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 
1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999). 
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